Medical confidence, the law, and computers: discussion paper Paul Sieghart Barrister, London The classical starting point of all discussion and analysis about medical confidence is the old one-to-one model of doctor and patient. The patient seeks the services of the doctor to cure some disease from which he believes himself to' be suffering, or at least to alleviate the presenting symptoms. In order to succeed in that enterprise, he must tell the doctor certain things about himself which he might not wish anyone else to know, and to submit himself to an examination which may reveal to the doctor other things that might normally remain hidden. By these means the doctor will acquire information about the patient which would otherwise remain secretthat is, things which other people would not normally come to know about the patient because he does not wish them to become known, and only makes them known on this occasion because this greatly enhances his prospects of cure or alleviation. In short, the bargain between patient and doctor is this: 'In order that you may be able to use your skills to'my best advantage, in my interest and for my benefit, I shall disclose to you certain secrets that I would not otherwise disclose to any stranger. I trust you to keep those secrets to yourself, to use them only for the single purpose for which I entrust them to you, and never to disclose them to anyone else without my consent'.
The model is familiar enough. It is simple because it involves only two people, and it is so deeply embedded in popular consciousness that the actual bargain which it reflects is probably never made explicitly, because it is generally assumed that everyone knows about it; it is taken as read, it goes without saying. It is what the law calls an 'implied term' of the relationship between the doctor and the patient, something which the law will infer from the relationship itself by applying the standard test for all implied terms: if an officious bystander, present while the parties were making their bargain, were to suggest such a provision to them, they would testily suppress him with a common 'Oh, of course!' (Shirlaw v Southern Foundries 1939) .
Nonetheless, I have called this the 'old' model, and for good reason. In a modern country like ours, disposing of highly sophisticated health services, a one-to-one episode involving one patient, one doctor, and no one else must nowadays be exceptionally rare. No doctor could keep in his head for long the thousands of items of confidential information he acquires about his patients, and he therefore records them on paper. Those records will be filed by his secretary. In order to help him with his diagnosis, he will take samples from the patient and send them to the laboratories for analysis, where the resulting confidences come into the possession of pathologists, technicians, and their secretaries. When in doubt, the doctor will refer the patient to a specialist who will conduct further examinations, acquire more information and pass this back to the referring doctor, via his secretary. If the patient suffers an episode of disability he will need to be nursed either in hospital or at home, and his nurses will need to be made privy to much of the secret clinical information which has been accumulated about him. He may need specialized treatment from one of the many paramedical professions, or perhaps from a clinical psychologist. He may need the benefit of one or other of the services dispensed by his health authority or local authority, and so a health visitor or a social worker will need to be brought on the scene, and given at least some of that clinical information. As a result, many of the secrets included in the original 'Paper read to Library (Scientific Research) Section, 26 January 1984 . Accepted 7 March 1984 bargain will be disseminated to a growing circle of other professionals, all concerned in one way or another with that patient's care.
Friends and enemies
So far, there is no great problem, for all these agencies are inherently friendly to our patient. Their concern is the same as his, and of the doctor to whom he first confided his secretsthat is, to cure the patient's disease, or at least alleviate its symptoms. They all have the same interest at heart, and the disclosure of the information to them is covered by at least the implied consent of the patient himself. Had he been asked whether the doctor might tell them his secrets in order to enhance the care for his health, he would doubtless have replied 'Oh, of course!', and the implied term as to confidentiality therefore covers them also: they too are bound not to use the information they acquire for any purpose other than the continuing clinical care of the patient, and not to disclose it, without his consent, to anyone who is not directly involved in that care.
In the English legal system, all this is covered by the common lawthat is, the law which has grown up over the centuries from precedent to precedent, through the odd case here and the odd case there, from which general legal principles can later be distilled. According to that law, the obligation of confidentiality in the bargain between doctor and patient is implied whether or not there is a formal contract between them, for there is a general principlestemming from the little-known branch of the law called 'breach of confidence'that if anyone receives confidential information in a situation of confidentiality, he is bound not to use or disclose it otherwise than for the purpose for which it was imparted to him, regardless of whether in strict law he received it under a contract, or a trust, or in some other way.
'Breach of confidence' is an important branch of the law, developed in the USA today into a full-blooded right of privacy, but not yet quite so fully developed in England. Most of the cases here so far have been about commercial secrets. Outside that area, the two bestknown recent cases were the one in which the Duchess of Argyll successfully prevented her ex-husband from publishing the secrets of their matrimonial bed in the Sunday People (Argyll v Argyll 1967), and the case of the late Richard Crossman's diaries, where the government sought to invoke the doctrine of breach of confidence to prevent their publication (Attorney General v Jonathan Cape 1976). Following the report of the Younger Committee on Privacy in 1972, the Lord Chancellor referred the whole doctrine to the Law Commission which reported on it in 1981, suggesting that it should be put on a statutory footing and providing a draft Bill for that purpose. Until that happensand there is no indication that such a step is imminentbreach of confidence remains part of our judgemade case law.
So much then for what I have called the friendly agencies. But the world is not made up exclusively of people whose only concern is the continuing health care of their patients. Other people have other jobs to do, if society is to be conducted with any semblance of peace and order; in the course of their work, they may well find themselves having interests opposed to those of individual patients. The West Yorkshire Police, for example, had no particular concern for the physical or mental health of the Yorkshire Ripper: their single concern was to identify him, arrest him and bring him to justice. Her Majesty's Inspectors of Taxes care littleat all events in their official capacitiesfor the health of their taxpayers: their concern is that these should render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's, no more and no less. Her Majesty's Commissioners for Customs and Excise share the concern of Her Majesty's Inspectors of Taxes when it comes to the assessment and collection of Value Added Tax, and of the police when it comes to the smuggling of heroin.
Other people, occupying official positions within our society, do have a concern for health, but one that extends beyond the health of any particular patient. Medical Officers of Environmental Health are concerned that infectious disease should be neither endemic nor epidemic within the areas for which they are responsible, even if that means interfering with the liberties of the odd individual by putting him in an isolation hospital. Social workers are concerned that babies should not be battered, even if that means removing them from their parents and putting them into the care of the local authority. The Driver and Vehicle Licensing Centre at Swansea is concerned that epileptics should not imperil the lives and health of others who use the roads, even if that means depriving them of their driving licences, and as a result often of their livelihood. Unlike the friendly agencies identified earlier, these agencies might be said to be potentially hostile to an individual patientnot for any malign or evil reason, but in the pursuit of some higher purpose, often called 'the national interest' or 'the public interest', with which they have been charged under laws or policies laid down by Parliament, the supreme sovereign agency in our constitution.
Here, we have a real problem. Let us recall that a doctor who has obtained confidential information about a patient, for the purpose of curing his disease or alleviating his symptoms, has bound himself not to disclose that information to anyone else for any other purpose. He is therefore perfectly entitled to disclose it to specialists, technicians, nurses, paramedicals and ancillary staff who are pursuing the same purpose. But where does he stand on disclosure to the police, Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise, DVLC and MOEHs whose purpose is not at all the continuing care of the patient, but something quite different which could in fact do him quite considerable harm, albeit for the benefit and in the interests of a great many other people?
So far, what the law has had to say about this problem is sporadic and piecemeal. The law of contract has no explicit exception for such disclosures. The law of breach of confidence provides a defence authorizing disclosure outside the protected area in order to avert what the judges have vaguely called a 'public iniquity', without defining it more precisely. At common law, the Courts have the power to require anyone to give evidence on subpoena of all he knows about the particular case being tried, however close the confidence in which he acquired the knowledge, in order that justice shall be properly done between the parties. Parliament has laid down a few other requirements, as in the case of notifiable infectious diseases under the Public Health Acts, the notification of drug addicts and abortions in order that central statistics may be maintained about them, and the notification of poisonings and accidents at work. There is a provision in section 168(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1972 which requires everyone, including health professionals, to tell the police on enquiry anything they know about road accidents which have caused personal injuries, and at least one doctor has been fined by a Magistrates' Court for refusing to comply with this provision, and his conviction was upheld in the High Court (Hunter v Mann 1974). Section 11(1) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1976 requires everyone to volunteer information to the police about terrorist offences, and makes criminals of those who fail to do so 'without lawful excuse'. (Whether the obligation of confidence resting on health professionals constitutes such a lawful excuse has not yet been tested in the courts.) On those occasions, therefore, Parliament has intervened to break the bond of secrecy between the patient and his health professionals.
Doctors, of course, are bound by what is loosely called the Hippocratic Oath, but is today perhaps more accurately described as a binding obligation of confidence laid down in their professional code of ethics, for which the ultimate sanction is removal from the Medical Register upon proof of a breach before the General Medical Council. Some other health professions, but by no means all, are bound by similar codes of ethicsin particular dentists, nurses and the professions supplementary to medicine. Other health professions do have a code of ethics, but it is not fully binding because they have no statutory 'closed shop' preventing them from practising, or holding themselves out to practise, if they are not registered with a statutory professional body. But all those codes only give general guidance; many decisions in particular cases are still left to the individual conscience. Here again, therefore, the position is confused. But at least one thing is clear: under our constitutional system Parliament is sovereign, and its laws bind us all whether we like them or not. Parliament is therefore perfectly competent to make new laws which override the old, and likewise to override the collective ethical principles of any profession, and the individual consciences of its members.
At the same time, we pride ourselves on being a free country; and one of its most important freedomsthough not one that is often explicitly included in a catalogue of them is the freedom to break the law if one's conscience forbids one to comply with it, provided one is willing to accept the consequences which the law then imposes. That was what the gynaecologist Mr Bourne did just before the last war, when he performed an abortion on a 14-year-old rape victim, after first notifying the Attorney-General of his intentions; in the event he was prosecuted, tried, and acquitted, so making new law (R v Bourne 1939) . That was also what Dr Hunter did, when he refused to give information to the police about two of his patients who had been involved in a road traffic accident (Hunter v Mann 1974). And a clinician who is brought before a Court as a witness under subpoena is perfectly free to refuse to say what he knows or to hand over his reports to the Courtif he is willing to risk being sent to prison for contempt. Since laws can only be enforced if they have at least the tacit consent of the majority of the population, and accord broadly with public morality, professionals practising in the health and other fields have a powerful weapon for constraining the extent to which Parliament can override their professional ethics, whatever the constitutional theory of the sovereignty of that great legislative assembly. The State as employer By a quirk of legal history, this whole area has been confused even more since the creation of the National Health Service. Within that service, through which the overwhelming majority of health care is today delivered in the United Kingdom, the old one-to-one model with which we began has been expanded into an uncomfortable (from the point of view of the doctor) one-to-two model. In the old model, the doctor only served one master: his patient, to whom he owed all his obligations of skill, care, and confidence. In the new model, he serves two masters: the patient whom he treats, and the State which employs himdirectly or indirectly. I have written elsewhere about the intractable problems of the professional ethics of serving two masters (Sieghart 1982) , and I shall not repeat that here. But in the special field of patients' secrets the effect is very odd, and probably quite unintended. It so happens that quite a different branch of the law, the law of master and servant, understandably provides that where a servant is paid to produce something for his master, it becomes the master's property. This has the curious result that when a patient and his NHS doctor agreeexplicitly, but more likely impliedlythat the doctor will not use or disclose the patient's secrets for any other purpose than the cure of his disease or the alleviation of its symptoms, that bargain undoubtedly binds the doctor; but when the doctor makes his notes on NHS paper, in NHS time, and very likely with an NHS pen, that document instantly becomes the property of the Secretary of State for Health and Social Security, who is perfectly entitled to read it, and to show it to anyone else he pleases.
What this means is that, in the NHS today, decisions about the disclosure of health records could in law be taken entirely by NHS administrators, acting on behalf of the Secretary of State, without the consent of the patient concernedor even that of the health professionals who made the records in the first place, or who now have the patient's continuing clinical care. Plainly, that is not a situation which could ever be acceptable to health professionals, brought up all their lives on codes of ethics requiring the strictest confidentiality. And so, successive Ministers of Health have sought to allay the professions' disquiet by declaring in Parliament that, although they have these powers in law, they would never dream of using them, and that their instructions to their administrators are never to make any such disclosures without at least first consulting the clinician concerned. But that is not the law: that is only a policy decision taken from time to time by health ministers, and there is not the slightest obligation on any future health minister to continue that policy. Any health minister who wished to could reverse it overnight. Nor is there any legal sanction for it: if an NHS administrator chooses for what seem to him to be sound reasons to break that ruleand such cases are not entirely unknownhe breaks no law, the patient has no remedy, and at worst the administrator will be admonished for breaking an internal rule of his service.
Advent of computers
Since the computer, in this context, is nothing more than a highly sophisticated (and increasingly cheap) filing cabinet, the computerization of health records ought to make no fundamental difference to any of the issues we have so far discussed. But, in practice, the position is rather different. Perhaps paradoxically, because of the irrational fears which many people exhibit about computersmuch as they exhibit them about other opaque technologies, such as nuclear engineeringthe result has been a powerful movement towards legislation to control the use made of personal data in computerized information systems. And that movement, which started in Europe more than a decade ago, has now caught up with us. Thanks to the international Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (reprinted 1982) adopted by the Council of Europe at Strasbourg -still too often confused with the European Communities at Brusselsthe United Kingdom has now been effectively forced to enact legislation about what has come to be called 'data protection', even though its present government, and the Home Office which has the carriage of the legislation, have never exhibited much enthusiasm for it. But if we do not have such legislation, we shall be left out of the growing European data protection club, and this could prove very costly to British industry and commerce if the flows of computerized data to and from them across our national borders, on which they now vitally depend, were to be inhibited by our European competitors.
For the first time, therefore, we are to have a statute which will regulate the flow of personal information between different users of it, including of course the users of health information about individual patients. This means that we shall no longer be able to go on with the traditional British muddle of a bit of judge-made case law here, the odd subsection in a statute there, some legal quirks which could have catastrophic effects on medical confidence, and nothing more than the odd ministerial self-denying ordinance to keep such catastrophes at bay from Parliament to Parliament. Whatever we now enact will provide the effective framework for medical confidentiality for decades to come, and we plainly cannot afford to get it wrong.
But let me try first to dispel two popular fallacies which have bedevilled this debate for too long. The first is that there is little evidence that anything has yet gone wildly wrong; that as a result of the advent of computers medical confidentiality has not so far been seriously breached in any substantial number of cases; and that we therefore have nothing to worry about. As a matter of recorded statistics, this is indeed perfectly true: there are, so far, few documented and authenticated cases of that kind (Report of the Committee on Data Protection 1978). But then in the nature of things such breaches, if there are any, would be very unlikely to come to public notice. And, as the Younger Committee pointed out as long ago as 1972, what is important is not the number of recorded instances of something going wrong, but an assessment of the risk that it may go wrong hereafter if nothing is done to stop it: 'We cannot on the evidence before us conclude that the computer.. .is at present a threat to privacy, but we recognise that there is a possibility of such a threat becoming a reality in the future' (Report of the Committee on Privacy 1972). In deciding whether to legislate at all, and if so how, it is the threat of future hazards which has to be evaluated, rather than the incidence of past events. In matters of this kind, no nation could be proud of a policy which deliberately waits to lock the stable door until the horses are bolting by the hundred: hence the conclusion by the government as long ago as 1975 that 'the time has come when those who use computers to handle personal information, however responsible they are, can no longer remain the sole judges of whether their own systems adequately safeguard privacy' (Computers and Privacy 1975) .
The second popular fallacy is that it is undesirable to legislate only for computerized information systems, leaving manual ones to look after themselves. There is certainly no tenable logic in discriminating between the two, the more so as almost every information system of any substantial size will soon be a combination of both. But here again, the practice differs from the theory. We have learnt over the centuries how to deal with records in manilla files, but once even part of such an information system becomes automated, even if only by the addition of a computerized index, we are faced with a new technology which makes feasible all sorts of things that could never have been feasible beforesimply because of the enormous amount of manpower which would have been necessary in a manual system to conduct the complex searches, find the correlations, or create the sophisticated 'inverted files', which computers can now perform in seconds. And, once there are rules for computerized systems, the same rules will in practice also need to be followed for manual systems, or for the manual parts of mixed systems: you simply cannot have different information systems used for the same purpose, and yet organised according to different rules. In the case of health information held by NHS systems, for example, it is inconceivable that regulations made under a Data Protection Act for computerized systems will not rapidly be followed by DHSS guidance advising or directing health authorities to follow the same rules for their manual systems. In the end, the computerized tail must wag the manual dog.
For the first time ever, therefore, the health professions now need to devise formal rules about the use and disclosure of the personal health information with which they are entrusted. Instead of making ad hoc decisions by guess or by God, or even by reference to the general guidelines in their codes of ethics, or to their variably informed individual consciences, their professional minds will need to concentrate on some major issues which can no longer be ducked, avoided, or blurred. When should a patient be denied access to information about himself, by whom, and on what grounds? Precisely when is a health researcher to be given clinical information about identifiable patients without their consent? What safeguards are then to be required from him in those patients' interests? In precisely what circumstances can such information be released to the police for the prevention or detection of crime, or the apprehension and prosecution of its perpetrators? Should it ever be disclosed to Inland Revenue, Customs and Excise, or the DVLC? Are the lay members of a Health Authority ever to be given access to ite.g. to investigate a complaint by a patient? If it is given, for the patient's benefit, to a social worker or health visitor employed by a Local Authority, can that Authority then use it for other purposes, such as the allocation of housing points? If not, how is that to be stopped? Perhaps most important of all, who is to decide such questions, by what procedures, and subject to what forms of public accountability?
An Interprofessional Working Group, under the chairmanship of Sir Douglas Black, is now looking urgently at questions like these, and preparing considered statements about them which are designed to guide the Health Departments in the preparation of the necessary ruleshopefully in the form of legally enforceable regulationsunder the Data Protection Act when it comes into force later this year. The Group includes representatives not only of practising doctors and dentists, but of nurses, midwives, health visitors, the professions supplementary to medicine, clinical psychologists, social workers, and researchersreflecting the fact that health care today is almost invariably delivered by interdisciplinary teams. So far, the Group has exhibited complete unanimity on every one of the complex issues it has considered. They are issues of crucial importance to all health professionalsand even more to the patients and clients whom they serve. If those patients and clients once lost faith in the confidentiality of their personal health information, public health would suffer a devastating blow, and the Group's work is therefore of great public importance.
In the long run, the most important consequence of all this will be an increase in openness and transparency about the handling of personal information, and especially confidential health information, about individuals. As things stand at the moment most people, most of the time, have very little idea of who holds personal data about them, for what purposes, what they do with them, and to whom else they disclose them. That is a thoroughly undesirable state of affairs, not at all conducive to the. trust and confidence which should underlie all constructive relationships between people, and which must underlie all professional relationships. The advent of the computer may therefore prove to be a blessing in more ways than onenot only in giving professionals better access to the information they need, but in giving their patients and clients a far better understanding of what happens to that information and why, and far greater opportunities for ensuring that the information is right, and goes only to the right people for the right purposes. And that, ultimately, is the end which all confidentiality must serve.
